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COMMENTS
The Constitutional Supervision of
Administrative Agencies in the
Federal Republic of
Germany: Similarities
and Contrasts with American Law
LEE A. ALBERT*
The thesis of Professor Lorenz' Article'-A Search for Possibilities,
Means and Limits of Substantive Bonds, Leadership and Control of
Administrative Activities-has a special timeliness for the United
States. The fundamentals of federal administrative power in this coun-
try were once thought resolved when in 1946, by unanimous vote of
both houses of Congress, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was
enacted.2 This statute has long been regarded as a basic legal charter
for the federal administrative establishment.3 Although certain ques-
tions of legitimacy lingered, the center of attention shifted from consti-
tutional checks and balances to more particularized and interstitial
issues of control and limits as the federal judiciary created a corpus of
public law from the APA, the Constitution, and the general norms of
the legal order.4
Despite the imposing edifice of procedural and substantive princi-
Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1960, Rutgers; LL.B.
1963, Yale University.
1. Lorenz, The Constitutional Supervision of the Administrative Agencies in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 543 (1980).
2. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, P.L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-706 (1976)).
3. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978). The APA has been resistant to major amendments for the past three decades.
4. See Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1041, 1041-42 (1975).
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ples that federal courts have constructed over the last three decades,
basic issues of control and legitimacy once again have emerged as the
focus of debate over American administrative law. Widespread ques-
tioning of the accepted presuppositions of the federal administrative
process and of the adequacy of existing mechanisms of accountability
is the major theme of modern legal commentary on federal administra-
tion.5 Such doubts provide the major impulse behind bold initiatives
and proposals from all three branches of the federal government.6 As
in the formative period of American administrative law in the 1930's,
the problem once again is to reconcile expansive delegation of power
with processes of democratic control, scrutiny, and participation, and to
provide more effective assurance of administrative responsiveness to
legislated values. Recognition that federal courts alone cannot provide
adequate solutions and that Congress and the President bear significant
responsibilities are among the more promising themes in this renewed
quest for legitimate and responsible administrative policymaking.7
Two factors underlying the present pursuit of alternative mecha-
nisms of control are similar to those prevailing in the Federal Republic:
greater demands upon government for complex and specialized tasks,
and the need for clear and comprehensive governmental policies on the
one hand and flexible case-specific administrative decisions on the
other, echoed in American legal jargon as rulemaking versus adjudica-
tion as the preferable mode for formulating administrative policy. Two
other impulses behind reform are more indigenously American: regu-
latory failure and presidential abuse. These occur when bouyant ex-
pectations of national, social, and economic reform through the
administrative process have yielded to a sober appreciation of the dis-
tance between regulatory objectives and actual achievements. Unsatis-
factory regulatory outcomes occasionally are attributed to ill-conceived
legislative programs, but more often to misguided and torpid adminis-
tration. Many observers assert that federal agencies, in making discre-
tionary choices, have failed to pursue or effectuate the goals of their
legislative mandates and have been unresponsive to the groups, inter-
5. See, e.g., Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395
(1975); Freedman, supra note 4; McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
6. See Abourezk, The Congressional Veto.4 Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional
Control of,4dministrative Regulation: 4 Study ofLegislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977);
McGowan, supra note 5, at 1135-42, 1162-65, 1168-69.
7. McGowan, supra note 5, at 1135-42, 1162-65, 1168-69.
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ests, and collective values their programs were designed to serve.8 Viet-
nam, then Watergate and its aftermath, have fueled anxieties over the
constitutional imbalance created by the unchecked accretion of execu-
tive power and have provoked resounding appeals for Congress to reas-
sert its legislative prerogatives. 9
Professor Lorenz properly cautions that a sensitive awareness of
the differences and similarities among governmental structures, consti-
tutional provisions, historical circumstances, traditions, and conven-
tions is particularly relevant to a comparative exploration of the legal
norms that authorize, limit, and control administrative authority and
that define the roles of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions.
In addition, national governments have their own particular variety of
informal influences and constraints on administration, founded on cus-
tom and convention and more political than legal, arising out of a myr-
iad of interactions and relationships among government officials. Such
leeway between formal authority and less visible controls often tends to
elude domestic legal analysis and poses equally formidable problems
for comparative assessment.' This Comment will not attempt to ex-
plore the implications associated with the structural and organizational
differences in the legislative and executive branches of the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Instead, some apparent
parallels and contrasts in the structure and functions of administrative
agencies and the formal legal measures relied upon to cope with ad-
ministrative government will be highlighted.
A thumbnail history of American administrative law with its ini-
tial and continuing emphasis upon independent regulatory commis-
sions should assist in understanding some important differences
between the United States and the Federal Republic in the prototype of
federal administrative activity and some consequent differences in legal
responses.
Administrative activity beyond ordinary executive enforcement of
statutes had respectable precedent in nineteenth century America but
recognition of administrative law as a system of interrelated legal limits
and procedural requirements did not emerge in this country until the
New Deal responses to the Depression, which marked a departure from
8. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667,
1682 (1975); Wright, supra note 5, at 575-76, 578-79.
9. See, e.g., Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 13 (1974).
10. See Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: 4 Discipline in Search of an Organizing
Princile, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 120, 121-35 (1977).
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the tradition of a limited central government. The profusion of multi-
membered specialized commissions with armories of powers over pri-
vate business activities, coupled with the Supreme Court's first and last
invalidations of a major governmental program on unconstitutional
delegation of powers grounds, " provoked a searching controversy over
the constitutional legitimacy of a system of burgeoning administrative
authority and the inseparable need for the law to monitor and safe-
guard its exercise.
The organization and powers of the new administrative system
posed fundamental theoretical questions under a Constitution that es-
tablished three distinct branches of government, without reference to
administrative agencies, and that carefully assigned the national legis-
lative power to a representative Congress, the executive power to an
elected President, and the judicial power to independent and secure
federal judges. Notwithstanding this tripartite structure of government
institutions exercising separate powers, the New Deal agencies were
formally separate from the Congress, President, and federal courts, a
"headless" fourth branch in the charged rhetoric of that era. Further,
these unique institutions starkly combined the powers and functions of
all three branches within one governmental institution. The New Deal
proliferation of specialized commissions sparked a parallel struggle in
the political arena over the propriety of massive governmental inter-
vention in the economy and the practical dangers to liberty and prop-
erty from such unaccountable concentrations of power under barely
defined legislative mandates.
The responses to these issues during this formative era of the ad-
ministrative process has had an enduring influence on the system of
controls and limits comprising American administrative law. In partic-
ular, the multifunction independent agency with specialized jurisdic-
tion over key sectors of the economy (e.g., transportation, securities
exchanges, labor relations, and trade practices) became the paradigm of
administration at the federal level and, therefore, the focal point for the
creation and elaboration of administrative law.12 Although constraints
and limits in administrative law today embrace far more federal activ-
ity than do the regulatory commissions, (e.g., benefactory and manage-
rial functions) the principles applied are primarily those initially
11. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
12. See general, R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941); J.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-46 (1938).
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formulated to govern the independent regulatory commissions. In-
deed, it is both a strength and a weakness of American administrative
law that it attempts to impose on the bewildering diversity of federal
agencies and functions a relatively unitary framework of principles,
doctrines, and concepts based on a general model of the administrative
process. For example, the A.P.A. procedural mandates apply to nearly
all exercises of executive and administrative authority, and courts em-
ploy the mandates in judging the validity of such diverse administrative
actions as the denial of a broadcast license, the revocation of welfare
benefits, and the licensing of a nuclear energy facility.
Despite this nation's commitment to constitutionalism, Americans
have no adequate constitutional theory underpinning the formal inde-
pendence of the regulatory commissions from the executive branch of
government. In holding that a member of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion was not subject to the President's plenary removal power over
policymaking executive officials, the Supreme Court's single attempt to
provide such a theory reveals the theoretical vacuum: "To the extent
that it exercises any executive function-as distinguished from execu-
tive power in the constitutional sense-it does so in the discharge and
effectuation of its quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or as an
agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government."' 3
The Court also reminds us that each of the three departments of gov-
ernment must be free from the control of the others. Protecting the
judicial function from executive domination is apt and understanda-
ble, 14 but the premise that proper effectuation of a congressional man-
date must be outside the President's constitutional responsibility to
execute faithfully the laws'5 is incongruent with the constitutional tril-
ogy. Similarly, despite heroic attempts, we are without a satisfying the-
ory for justifying the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial
functions under a Constitution that decrees their separation necessary
for the responsible exercise of power. Observation that distinctions be-
tween the three powers are not precise and become blurred at the edges
or that the Constitution itself endorses the President's veto in the legis-
lative process is not a persuasive justification for a designed combina-
tion of the essence of legislative, executive, and judicial power in a
single governmental institution.
13. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). But see Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
14. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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These constitutional doubts have not entirely disappeared; cou-
pled with the remaining influence of a laissez-faire economic philoso-
phy, they have significantly influenced attitudes and law regarding
federal administration. Most broadly, federal regulatory activity has
been viewed not to be quite wholesome or healthy fare and hence to be
accepted with commensurate caution. Similarly, the performance of
regulatory agencies has been the subject of much critical examination
and commentary; the crisis of the administrative process and proposals
for radical surgery have been constantly reiterated. 6 Although the de-
tails vary from decade to decade, such chronic disquiet and attack ap-
pear to implicate principle as well as the goals of expediency and
effectiveness.
Skepticism and scrutiny are not limited to legal pundits. Because
the independent commissions are beyond the mantle of a constitution-
ally ordained department of government, all three branches assert and
exercise control over these agencies without the deference to which a
coordinate branch of government would be entitled. Agency isolation
is not only reflected in conflicting proprietary claims of Congress and
the President but reverberates in the expansive and searching character
of judicial review of agency action, perhaps best captured in the judi-
cially imposed conception of a court-agency partnership in the enter-
prise of public administration.'
7
Accordingly, the significant characteristics of American adminis-
trative law reflect this early preoccupation with the independent com-
missions. Such basic themes as highly permissive delegations, rigorous
agency procedures for rulemaking and adjudication, and intense judi-
cial scrutiny of substance as well as process have been tailored to fit the
constitutional status, specialized tasks, and decisional impacts of these
agencies.
Professor Lorenz observes that initial parliamentary authorization
is required for most administrative acts in the Federal Republic with
the exception of certain managerial functions (prisons for instance)
where original legislative power or rules without statutory bases are
permissible.'" Perhaps his reference here is to degree of legislative
specificity but the principle of administrative power without a statutory
16. See, e.g., Cutler & Johnson, supra note 5; Freedman, supra note 4; Hector, Problems of
the CrB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Robinson, On
Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV. 947 (1971).
17. E.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972).
18. Lorenz, supra note 1, at 555-56.
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foundation is inadmissible in American law. At a minimum, Congress
must legislate a charter for an administrative body and outline its pow-
ers and areas of responsibility. In this limited sense, the constitutional
allocation of legislative power to Congress remains operative. 19 To be
sure, a legislative mandate carries with it a variety of implicit powers
justifying procedural and organizational rules necessary for imple-
menting a program. But Americans would distinguish sharply between
this implied authority and the existence of original lawmaking power in
an administrative body. Moreover, except for certain institutions for
which a specific constitutional guarantee endorses decentralized deci-
sionmaking (e.g., public education), administrative discretion, auton-
omy, or creativity is rarely regarded as more desirable than legislative
specificity and control.
The modem American judicial articulation of the constitutional
doctrine of delegation is similar to that in the Constitution of the Fed-
eral Republic. Some degree of legislative definition of goals and stan-
dards is required,20 but the vitality and application of the delegation
doctrine apparently differ. The Supreme Court's singular application
of the delegation doctrine in 1935 and its subsequent exhortation in
judicial decisions and legal commentary has not induced Congress to
be more precise or directive in its expansive grants of lawmaking pow-
ers. Broad-gauged and ill-defined administrative authority invariably
survives judicial challenge.
The substantive regulatory tasks and procedures of the independ-
ent regulatory commissions illuminate this unusual divergency between
judicial rhetoric and holdings in delegation controversies. Indeed, the
vast discretionary authority vested in these politically unaccountable
bodies, in contrast to delegations to the President or high executive offi-
cials, has had greater immunity from scrutiny under the delegation
doctrine. Their substantive programs initially at least were least sus-
ceptible to advance congressional specification of policy and direction.
The New Deal controls over dynamic and rapidly changing sectors of
the economy were both unprecedented and experimental; regulation
entailed continuous investigation, decision, and revision of specialized,
technical, and complex issues prior to emergence of basic policy ques-
19. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126,
144 (1941).
20. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 589-90 (1963); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 425 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737,
746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
19801
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA L4W REVIEW [Vol. 53:583
tions. Given that these programs were the prototype of federal admin-
istrative action, the Supreme Court's acceptance of near-standardless
grants of lawmaking power was an acknowledgement that Congress
was ill-equipped to do more than paint broadly. It also was an ac-
knowledgement that a distinction between legitimate delegations com-
pelled by subject matter and delegations for reasons of political
maneuvering or irresponsibility would be an elusive one for federal
courts to make. The costs of error counselled restraint. Moreover, as
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) cases illustrate, orderly
and structured processes and procedural safeguards figured as large in
the Court's delegation calculus, as did the source of lawmaking author-
ity in a representative democracy.2' Unlike NIRA administration, the
independent commissions well satisfied such procedural concerns, and
federal courts were both available and institutionally competent to as-
sure procedural fairness and articulated reasoned decisions.
Some American commentators advocate the transformation of del-
egation as a theoretical limit on legislative power into a more practical
control on unavoidable discretionary power, arguing for a judicially
imposed condition that agencies, in response to regulatory experience,
formulate rules and standards to narrow and channel the contours of
initial grants of authority." The objective behind this reformulation is
predictability and clarity in the law applied by agencies. But by substi-
tuting administrative for legislative standards, this position abandons
concern over a politically representative and accountable source of law-
making authority.. In contrast are the increasing appeals for judicial
revitalization of the constitutional delegation doctrine as a means of
requiring Congress to fulfill its constitutional lawmaking responsibili-
ties. 3
There are yet some flickers of life in delegation as it relates to poli-
cymaking in a democratic society, a less systematic and developed par-
allel to what Professor Lorenz describes as required parliamentary
ordering of administrative action that affects constitutional private in-
terests and a broader category of "essential decisions."24
21. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935); Pan-
ama Refining Corp. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
22. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55-59 (1969); Davis,
A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713 (1969).
23. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 424-25
(1975); T.J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 297-99 (1969); McGowan, supra note 5, at 1128-30;
Wright, supra note 5, at 593-97.
24. Lorenz, supra note 1, at 559-61.
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A similar insistence that Congress squarely confront and decide
certain issues instead of leaving them to the discretionary authority of
administrative bodies is reflected in scattered Supreme Court decisions.
But the technique is to apply a special canon of statutory construc-
tion-the requirement of "clear legislative statement"-to construe
narrowly a delegation that infringes upon fundamental individual lib-
erties or raises other basic questions of political accountability. The
classic example is Kent v. Dulles,"5 in which the Secretary of State pur-
suant to an apparently unrestricted and vintage grant of discretion to
the President over passports denied passports to members of the Com-
munist Party. Observing that a constitutionally sensitive area of liberty
to travel was at risk, the Court held that Congress had not specifically
made Communist Party membership a ground for refusing a passport.
The considerable evidence of customary practice suggesting that Con-
gress had approved (albeit offhandedly and not explicitly) was rejected
because the constitutionality of such practices had not been squarely
confronted by Congress or the President in the ordinary lawmaking
process. The scope of Kent perhaps was impaired several years later
when the Court upheld, on statutory and constitutional grounds, the
Secretary of State's use of area controls to restrict travel under the same
vague delegation. 6 The customs were not clearer than those in Kent,
and the travel restriction, at a minimum, posed a serious constitutional
question although ultimately the restriction was found to be valid.
Taken together, these cases appear to restrict the clear and specific leg-
islative authorization doctrine to instances when administrative action
actually violates rather than impinges upon a constitutionally protected
interest.
There are, however, similar selective exclusions from vague dele-
gations to congressional investigatory committees, the Secretary of De-
fense, and other officials based on the requirement that Congress must
specifically authorize constitutionally dubious exercises of authority.27
Moreover, the technique has been utilized in several contexts to protect
individual interests when an agency invoked questionable procedures
or formulated dubious substantive policies affecting individual lib-
erty.28 In Greene v. McElroy,29 for instance, the Court declined to up-
25. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
26. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
27. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957); Rumely v. United States, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
28. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17,
26-27 (1968). See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 159-69 (1962).
29. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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hold an implicit grant of authority to the Defense Department to
administer a security clearance program affecting eligibility for em-
ployment that contained inadequate procedural safeguards. "Without
explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import
and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under
our system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide
them."3
More recently, the clear statement principle was extended to an
"essential decision," when the Court perceived the administrative im-
position of fiscal exactions on two regulated industries to defray the
costs of administration under an ill-defined but broad statute as more
similar to a tax than a fee for services.3 The Court narrowed the stat-
ute "to avoid constitutional problems" 32 and found that the agencies
had acted ultra vires. The constitutional problem was not individual or
economic liberty but separation of powers, based on the premise that
the power to tax is a "legislative function" peculiarly within the pur-
view of Congress. Given this nation's long tradition of detailed and
tight control over taxation, a novel delegation of taxing authority re-
quires an unambiguous and forceful endorsement by Congress.
Such statutory interpretation is not derived from legislative history
or purpose. Instead, it reflects the Court's attempt to impose on Con-
gress an obligation to confront, deliberate, and speak unequivocally on
certain significant questions. Like the delegation doctrine, its purpose
is to keep clear the channels of policymaking and lines of responsibility
in a representative democracy. Unlike delegation, the technique is
more discriminating. It substitutes selective surgery for wholesale in-
validation of a program. In relying on statutory construction, the
Court also avoids invoking final constitutional ultimatums.
Administrative action affecting freedom of expression or operating
as a prior restraint is subject to special and rigorous constitutional prin-
ciples based upon a specific constitutional prohibition rather than sepa-
ration of powers constraints. Hence, statutes restricting speech,
assembly, or the press may not "overbroadly" inhibit protected private
activity under the first amendment along with unprivileged conduct. 33
30. Id at 507.
31. Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 349-351 (1974); Na-
tional Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342-44 (1974).
32. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974). See also
Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
33. E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
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Similarly, laws authorizing administrative agencies to issue permits for
the use of public forums as places of assembly and expression must
limit the determination to time, place, and manner without leeway for
covert choice among messages or views to be presented.3 4 In addition,
the due process guarantee of fair notice requires some degree of defi-
niteness in a standard of conduct as the basis for imposing sanctions on
private behavior.3' Reflecting a bifurcation of administrative and con-
stitutional law in American legal thought and pedagogy, these special
restrictions are regarded as substantive constitutional constraints on
governmental action rather than limits on the delegation of administra-
tive authority.
Although Congress has long relied upon the federal judiciary to
insure responsible administration, it has recently manifested an interest
in retaining more control over the scope and use of the authority con-
ferred upon administrative officials, not through refined initial delega-
tions but primarily in proposals that would give either House of
Congress a veto over administrative rules and regulations. 36 Such nul-
lification provisions have been adopted in a score of separate adminis-
trative programs dealing with sensitive or volatile issues,3 7 and several
current proposals extend applicability to practically the entire range of
federal agency rules and regulations.38 Typically, such veto authority
permits either House of Congress to adopt a resolution, within a speci-
fied time period, disapproving the rule on legal or policy grounds; some
contemplate the action of both Houses. None, however, subject the
legislative nullification of a rule to the President's veto power over ordi-
nary legislation.39
One further variation in the proposals to increase political partici-
pation relies on a three-step process. First, all agency rules, including
those of the independent commissions, would be submitted to the Presi-
dent for review, revision, or rejection in an informal rulemaking proce-
dure that includes public participation. The rule then would be subject
to the veto of either House of Congress. Finally, the courts would re-
view any rule emerging from this process for compliance with the
34. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); see Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
35. E.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Gonzalez v. Freeman,
334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See generally Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
36. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 1369-1409; McGowan, supra note 5, at 1133-39.
37. See Abourezk, supra note 6, at 324; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 1381-1409.
38. See McGowan, supra note 5, at 1133-39.
39. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 7.
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agency's enabling statute.4° The common theme behind all these pro-
posals is to ameliorate the lack of public accountability in the adminis-
trative process while accepting the inevitability of broad delegations.
That separation of powers principles are alive and well in the
United States may be seen in the variety of intricate constitutional ob-
jections to congressional review of administrative lawmaking. Some
argue that a congressional veto of a rule on "policy" grounds is an en-
croachment upon the executive's constitutional power to administer
statutory programs, a curious objection when applied to regulatory
agencies outside the executive branch. A parallel argument challenges
the veto as an infringement upon federal judicial power to the extent
that it entails congressional review of the legality of administrative law-
making. Further, congressional nullification evades the President's
constitutional veto power over acts of Congress, and the one-House
veto violates the principle of bicameralism. These proposals have pro-
voked equally vigorous and diverse debate over whether the busy
agenda of Congress permits it to participate effectively in the continu-
ous process of administration, and whether such participation would
result in better or more responsive agency policy-making. 41
The centrality of the third branch-the courts-in administrative
government also enters the controversy over legislative veto in the con-
cern that such "reverse legislation" might severely curtail judicial scru-
tiny of agency rules by according them the implicit approval of
Congress and hence the judicial deference normally afforded statutes of
Congress.
Feasibility permits but a sketch of a few of the themes regarding
the complex mainstay of control in American administrative law-ju-
dicial review of agency action.
In formulating the procedures agencies must follow, federal courts
having general or nonspecialized jurisdiction have an ample reservoir
of legal authority from which they may freely draw. Legal norms de-
rived by the courts in their accepted role as the ultimate guardians of
legality, radiations from the due process guarantees in the Constitution,
and the provisions of the APA render a distinction between constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional underpinnings for judicial control undis-
cemible and artificial. For example, in setting aside administrative
40. Cutler & Johnson, supra note 5, at 1414-17.
41. See Abourezk, supra note 6; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 1409-40; McGowan,
supra note 5, at 1149-62; Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983 (1975).
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action for failure to follow previously announced rules or settled pat-
terns of precedent, or for unjustified retroactivity in applying new deci-
sional principles, courts do not pause to specify the legal source of the
controlling norm.42
Recognition of the political rather than expert or technical choices
inherent in agency discretion together with increased distrust of the
wisdom and responsiveness of agency decisions has led to a new era of
more exacting judicial review, particularly reflected in rigorous scrutiny
of factual and analytical bases of agency choices in rulemaking as well
as adjudication.43 Moreover, Congress has fortified this movement by
providing demanding formulas for judicial review of agency rules in
certain instances.'
The Supreme Court's scrutiny of a highly informal administrative
action entailed in the Secretary of Transportation's approval of a high-
way grant in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Vope45 is illus-
trative. Although the Secretary's decision warranted "a presumption of
regularity," that presumption did not "shield his action from a thor-
ough, probing, in-depth review."46 This searching review extended not
only to the "range of choices that the Secretary can make" under the
statute but also to "whether the Secretary properly construed his au-
thority" and whether his "decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors."'47 As indicated in Volpe, the traditional presumptive
validity that attaches to agency rules frequently yields to a court's ple-
nary power to interpret law. Moreover, the scope of agency discretion
is that which remains after judicial construction of the enabling statute.
Searching review is also reflected in judicial transformation of the
informal notice and comment rulemaking procedures, which require an
agency to give notice of a proposed rule, afford persons an opportunity
42. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959); Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41,
46-47 (1951); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson, Co., 195 F.2d 141, 149 (9th Cir. 1952); International
Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 923-24 (Ct. Cf. 1965). See generally Albert,
Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogatefor Claim for Relief, 83
YALE L.J. 425, 456-61 (1974).
43. See Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1193 (4th Cir. 1976);
National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 37-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See
generally Gardner, Federal Courts andAgencies: An Audit ofThe Partnership Books, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 800 (1975); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185 (1974).
44. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060 (1976); Federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1976); see Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 469
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
45. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
46. Id at 415.
47. Id at 416.
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to submit written comments, and then provide a brief explanation of
the rule adopted. This legislative model for rulemaking leaves an
agency free to consult any relevant material without notice and custom-
arily provides a cursory justification for an agency choice. Because the
record emanating from such informality does not permit serious explo-
ration of the merits, the federal courts, to facilitate effective review,
have required greater initial disclosure to the public of the data and
analyses on which the agency may rely and a detailed agency response
to public submissions challenging the proposed rule. Agencies may
neither ignore this required dialogue with interested parties nor fail to
provide a detailed response and explanation for final adoption of a
rule.48 Thus, elements of the adversary process have been injected into
administrative lawmaking. At times, judicial assessment of agency
rulemaking procedures-particularly the adequacy of responses to
public evidentiary and analytical comments-is a procedural means of
expressing dissatisfaction over substantive agency policies and out-
comes. While the Supreme Court recently disapproved this lower court
experiment in judicializing the informal rule-making process, it did not
repudiate the underlying objective of assuring adequate agency explo-
ration and justification in formulating policy through rules.49
The American commitment to the adversary process as the para-
digm of fair legal procedure has traditionally required something simi-
lar to a judicial trial in adjudication by agencies in the business
regulatory arena. A seminal article sixteen years ago observed that
"[t]he law of government largesse has developed with little regard for
procedure."5 Developments since then, mostly judicial, are today well
reflected in commentary expressing reservations over the imposition of
trial-type hearing requirements on administrative action in "mass jus-
tice" programs, such as pensions, welfare, public housing, and disabil-
ity benefits.5 Hearing rights also attach to disciplinary actions against
students, prisoners, holders of various permits and licenses, parolees,
48. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir.
1977); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Seegenerally
Breyer, Vermont Yankee And the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1833 (1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of4dministrative Procedure. A Some-
what Dffierent View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee andthe Evolution of
Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
49. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
50. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783 (1964).
51. B. SCHWARTZ & H.W. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE
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and, more unevenly, government employees.52 Respect for accurate
determinations, the individual dignity associated with participatory
rights, the desirability of decisional visibility, and agency accountabil-
ity have eroded the hoary distinction between rights and privileges that
once served as the test for determining the applicability of procedural
safeguards. Instead, the demanding and costly elements of the adver-
sarial trial provide a yardstick for measuring the adequacy of agency
process in individual cases. 3 An administrative hearing thus typically
requires the rudiments of due process, a right to confront and cross-
examine agency witnesses, to present one's own case, and to have a
decision by an impartial official based solely on the evidence presented
at the hearing. Explicit administrative findings and a formal transcript
are the usual mechanisms used to insure the observance of these rights
and to provide an adequate foundation for administrative appeals and
judicial review.
The burdens of process are not irrelevant, however, and agencies
are afforded considerable flexibility in accommodating trial-type safe-
guards to the variety of disputed factual issues, the different stakes at
risk, and the agency's objectives involved in agency adjudication. Oc-
casionally, administrative exigencies allow for the relaxation or omis-
sion of one or more of these elements of the adversarial process.54 But
these deviations are exceptions requiring special justification within the
confines of a particular program. Because relatively elaborate proce-
dures are the norm for most adjudicatory actions, the administrative
hearing is not an auxiliary but a central control in American adminis-
trative law.
Other salient features of the recent judicial reformation of Ameri-
can administrative law include a marked relaxation of principles gov-
erning the availability and timing of judicial review and the class of
persons entitled to participate in administrative proceedings and to ob-
LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 132 (1972); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-1304 (1975).
52. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975) (disciplinary action against students);
Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974) (disciplinary action against prisoners); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (dismissal of government employee); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 781-82 (1973) (probation revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (dismissal of police officer does not
require hearing).
53. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-
97 (1959).
54. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-831 (1975); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
566-72 (1974); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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tain judicial review of administrative action." A decade ago, the
Supreme Court endorsed a strong presumption of reviewability in ob-
serving that "judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved
person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe
that such was the purpose of Congress."56 The APA exception for ad-
ministrative actions committed by law to agency discretion, as qualified
by review for abuse of discretion, now encompasses an exceedingly
narrow band of administrative decisions that are not susceptible to
rules or law (such as the choice among competing applicants for re-
search grants), or decisions that entail high order foreign policy or de-
fense considerations." Similarly, most formal administrative rules
may be challenged in court prior to invocation against particular per-
sons. Individuals and groups subject to a rule need not choose between
costly compliance and risky violation to secure a judicial determination
of a rule's validity under the prevailing standard of ripeness.5 8
Liberalized American rules of standing appear to contrast sharply
with those of the Federal Republic. Under present American stan-
dards, any class of interests that an administrator is required by statute
implicitly or explicitly to consider in making policy choices is entitled
to challenge an agency determination in court. Hence, judicial review
is available to members of large, unorganized classes with diverse inter-
ests, such as consumers, environmentalists, and television viewers.
That any individual member's stake in agency policy is comparatively
modest, or indeed minute, is no barrier to entitlement to participate in
administrative proceedings and thereafter to obtain judicial review.5 9
Indeed, some American courts have characterized litigants with such
modest interests as representative of the public interest, thus viewing
judicial surveillance as serving the effectuation of public values. This
view has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court and rules of stand-
ing still require an identifiable personal stake in the administrative ac-
tion under challenge.6
Nonetheless, the extension of standing to such a broad range of
affected interests reflects a widespread judicial reaction to perceived
55. See Stewart, supra note 8, at 1081-88.
56. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
57. Compare Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and Kletschka v. Driver,
411 F.2d 436,442-44 (2d Cir. 1969) with Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
58. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) with Toilet Goods Ass'n
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
59. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
60. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-40 (1972).
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agency failures to represent unorganized interests, and the correspond-
ing need for judicial scrutiny to rectify such neglect. As candidly stated
by then Circuit Judge Burger:
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the
listener interests ... is one of those assumptions we collectively try
to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it be-
comes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assump-
tion. . . neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it.6
1
Such widely shared skepticism over the responsiveness of federal
agencies to legislated values not represented by organized, cohesive in-
terest groups has had a powerful effect on judicial scrutiny of agency
action particularly when agencies purport to accommodate competing
and often conflicting relevant interests. The line between permissible
agency discretion to balance and reconcile, and agency abuse of discre-
tion in affording undue weight to a particular interest, has become
blurred. Reviewing courts have engaged in more open and explicit
scrutiny of substantive agency policies because of the considerable and
persuasive input of newly organized noncommercial interest groups. In
taking a "hard look" at agency decisions combining technical factors
with important value choices, conclusory assurances and the invocation
of expertness frequently are not sufficient for long-range or important
policy outcomes affecting the environment, safety, health, and impor-
tant personal interests. Full and persuasive articulation has become the
key component of the judicial demand for reasoned decisionmaking.62
These and other innovations in administrative law during the last
decade demonstrate the resourcefulness and creativity of the federal
judiciary. Significant expansion of judicial review has taken place and
Congress has responded with increased reliance on the courts and ap-
proval of more exacting review, even requiring it in many new admin-
istrative programs.63 But the judicial swathe in the landscape should
not be overdrawn. The elusive line between a judicial checking func-
tion and administrative planning and policy creation has not been
abandoned, however intense the search for responsible decisions. A
61. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003-04
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
62. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Tan-
ners' Council of Am., Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976); Amoco Oil Co v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Nathanson, Probing the Mindofthe Admin-
istrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure
Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975).
63. See note 44 supra.
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well established legal tradition providing contours for judicial power,
along with acknowledged institutional limitations on the capacities of
generalist courts, are potent forces in maintaining an imprecise division
between legality and wisdom. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently re-
minded lower federal courts in unusually forceful terms that they may
not impose the "best" solutions, even procedural ones, on the adminis-
trative establishment.' Judicial review has become neither a substitute
for an ombudsman in monitoring the administrative process nor a pan-
acea for its ills.
64. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
